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In tl1e Sttpreme Court of the 
State of Utah_ 
HUGH J. HATCH and 
ARDEAN HATCH, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
STEPHEN ADAMS, SARAH 
ADAMS, and EARL ADAMS, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
CASE 
NO. 8644 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case was tried without pretrial, upon issues rai·sed 
in the pleadings. We deem it therefore beneficial to review 
briefly the pleadings and outline the issue of the case before 
setting forth our statement of facts. 
The complaint, eouched in three counts, was brought 
to eompel the transfer of a stock certificate representing 
7¥2 shares of stock in the Provo Reservoir Water Users 
Company, on the theory that the water represented by such 
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shares was appurtenant to the land sold by contract, a 
farm in Alpine, Utah, and that title to such water the:re--
fore passed without specific mention of the certificate in 
the contract. The complaint contains additional general 
allegations seeking to quiet title to the certificate in the 
plaintiffs, and to recover damages for the wrongful with-
holding of such ·certificate from the plaintiffs. 
The answer, by admissions and denials, merely puts 
in issue the question Whether the water represented by this 
particular stock certificate is appurtenant to the land sold 
under the contract. 
It should be remembered that the case went to trial 
on this one issue only. This is not a case brought to re-
form a contract. Nor is it a case brought upon a theory 
of fraud or mistake in reducing the agreement to writing. 
Indeed, under the provisions of Rule 9 (b), UJ:tCP, such 
issue could not be raised upon the trial. 
In the spring of 1951 defendants had listed for sale a 
house and farm at Alpine, Utah. Plaintiffs called at the 
office of Mr. D. D. Bushnell, realtor, at Provo, and were 
shown the property by his son (Tr. 4). The next day, ac-
companied by Mr. Bushnell, they went over the property 
with two of the defendants (Tr. 4). 
An agreement was reached that the plaintiffs purchase 
the properties, and an earnest money agreement was en-
tered into March 29, 1951 (Exhibit 1 "B") (Tr. 90). This 
agreement was reduced to a uniform real estate contract, 
abrogating the earnest money receipt, which was executed 
April 2, 1951 (Exhibit 1 "D") (Tr. 90), and the parties, 
except Ardean Hatch, later met at the Bank of Pleasant 
Grove, Pleasant Grove, Utah, where they executed an es· 
crow agreement with the bank, whereby they escrowed 
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certain papers and documents (Exhibit 1 "E") (Tr. 10-11). 
The earnest money agreement and the uniform real es-
tate contract, after describing the farm land, stated 'Also 
all water rights appertaining thereto." The escrow agree-
ment contained the same language originally, but when 
the parties went to the bank to close the transaction, at 
the suggestion of Mr. West, the bank official, the follow-
ing was added thereto: "Lehi Irr. Co. Certs. Nos: 439D, 
7 sh; 440 D, 7 sh.; Alpine Irr. Co. Cert. No. 610, 36 sh." 
(Tr. 46). It is undisputed that the water represented by 
these shares was sold under the contract. It is also un-
disputed that the water represented by forty shares in the 
Highland Conservancy District, commonly called Deer 
Creek water, is appurtenant, and was therefore also sold 
under the contract. 
At the time of this transaction the defendants also 
owned water rights in Provo Reservoir Water Users Com-
pany to the extent of Tlj2 shares, represented by stock cer-
tificate number 1773. Nowhere in the eamest money agree-
ment, uniform real estate contract, or escrow agreement 
was this water right or stock certificate mentioned. It is 
the ownership of this certificate which is in dispute. 
Over defendants' objections because it violated the "pa-
role evidence" rule, and because it went beyond the issues 
raised by the pleadings, the court admitted voluminous 
testimony as to the preliminary negotiations of the parties 
prior to their execution of the real estate contract, with 
the understanding that it would entertain a motion to strike 
at the end of the case. The testimony thus presented, as 
it refers to the shares of stock in dispute, is in complete 
and sharp conflict. We add that for the most part plain-
tiffs' statement of facts in their brief consists of such tes-
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timony that is most favorable to their theory of the case. 
Plaintiffs continued to use the water under this certifi-
cate until the autumn of 1953, or spring of 1954, paying 
the assessments during that time (Tr. 12-13; 107). Their 
payments on these particular assessments were frequently 
delinquent (Tr. 55-56). Plaintiffs contend they were buy-
ing it; it is defendants' position they were renting it tem-
porarily, paying assessments as rental. Plaintiffs' conten-
tion, which we do not believe to be material anyway, is 
completely answered by the letJter mailed December 29, 
1953, by the plaintiff Ardean I:futch to the defendant Ste-
phen Adams. We deem it worthy of quote: "Dear Mr. 
Adams; We have been waiting before sending this water 
slip [notice of assessment] so we could see Mr. Day [the 
waterrnaster] and see how many hours we got for the 
seven shares, but my husband was on days for quite a while 
and he's been ill with the flu since before Christmas, so I 
thought I had better mail it to you and let you pay it. Then 
if we find it would pay us to keep it and you still have it, 
we can pay you. Hope you had a happy Christmas and 
that you have a Happy New Year. /s/ Mrs. Hugh Hatch" 
(Emphasis added). (Exhibit Def.-2) 
The only testimony offered which could have any bear-
ing on the issue whether the water right in issue is appur-
tenant to the land sold is that of Mr. Orval Cox Day, water-
master. 
He testified that according to his knowledge the water 
in d}spute was for the first time put on the farm sold to 
plaintiffs by Mr. Delos Boyer, then owner of the farm. In 
1916 or 1917 Mr. Boyer traded Lehi Irrigation Company 
water to a Mr. George Myers for ten shares of Provo Reser-
voir Company water which Mr .. Myers had owned for two 
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or three years (Tr. 68). After testifying that he was not 
too familiar with all the sources of water for the farm, he 
stated that in his opinion, without the water in controversy, 
the farm had a fair water right, and with the shares it had 
a good, but not a very good, water right (Tr. 70-71). He 
stated that suoh shares in his district were bought and sold 
every year (Tr. 75). That is the sum and substance of his 
testimony which would bear on the issue of this case. 
As a matter of fact, that is all the testimony presented 
in the entire trial bearing upon this issue. As stated earlier, 
considerable time was taken on the trial presenting testi-
moy on the preliminary negotiations leading to the contract 
of sale, all of which was material under the issue only on 
the question of what shares of water the parties intended 
to be transferred, and all of which is in sharp co!llflict. 
After the trial, the court found that the contract was 
not ambiguous, granted the motion of defendants to strike 
testimony bearing upon negotiations prior to execution of 
the contract offered to show what shares were intended to 
be transferred, and granted defendants judgment of no 
cause of action. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. NOT ONLY IS THERE NO EVIDENCE WHAT-
SOEVrER THAT THE WATER IN DISPUTE WAS EVER 
APPURTENANT TO THE LAND SOLD, BUT WHAT 
EVIDENCE THERE IS ON THIIS ISSUE IS TO THE 
CONTRARY. 
IT. PAROLE TESTIMONY ON NEGOTIATIONS 
PRELIMINARY TO EXECUTION OF THE CONTRACT 
WAS PROPERLY STRICKEN BY THE TRIAL COURT, 
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BECAUSE IF BELIEVED IT WOULD AT MOST VARY 
THE TERMS OF THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT, AND 
HAD NO PROBATIVE VALUE ON THE QUESTION 
WHETHER THE WATER INVOLVED WAS OR WAS 
NOT APPURTENANT TO THE LAND SOLD. 
ARGUMENT 
1. NOT ONLY IS THERE NO EVIDENCE WHAT-
SOEVER THAT THE WATER IN DISPUTE WAS EVER 
APPURTENANT TO THE LAND SOLD, BliT WHAT 
EVIDENCE THERE IS ON THIS ISSUE IS TO THE 
CONTRARY. 
The governing statute in this case is Section 73-1-10, 
U. C. A. 1953 (as amended by Chapter 134, L. U. '45), which 
provides: 
"Water rights shall be transferred by deed in substan-
tially the same manner as real estate, except when 
they are represented by shares of stock in a corpo-
ration, in which case water shall not be deemed to 
be appurtenant to the land . . . " 
This Court, in the case of Brimm v. Cache Valley Bank-
ing Co., (1954) 2 Utah 2d 93, 269 P2d 859, construed the 
effect of this statute. We quote therefrom: 
"We think the effect of the 1943 amendment to section 
100-1-10, U. C. A. 1943 (now 73-1-10, U. C. A. 1953) 
which added the phrase 'in which case water shall not 
be deemed to be appurtenant to the land' was to es-
tablish a rebuttable presumption that a water right 
represented by shares of stock in a corporation did 
not pass to the grantee as an appurtenance to the land 
upon which the water right was used, but that the 
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grantee could overcome suoh presumption if he could 
show by dear and convincing evidence that said wa-
ter right was in fact appurtenant and that the gran-
tor intended to transfer the water right with the land, 
even though no express mention of any water right 
was made in the deed." 
It will be noted that there are two requirements and 
that they are in the conjunctive: first, that the water rig1ht 
was in fact appurtenant, and second, that the grantor in-
tended to transfer the same. Evidence intended to meet 
the first requirement must be dear and convincing. We 
find NO evidence in the record mooting this first require-
ment 
We take it that a water right represented by a share 
or shares of stock is personal property, transferred by trans-
fer of the stock certificate as any other personal property 
thus represented is transferred, unless the person asserting 
otherwise can show by clear and convincing evidence that 
the water in fact belongs to the particular land as a matter 
of right-that it was appropriated to that land and has 
not been severed therefrom. 
As set forth in the statement of facts, the water mas-
ter, OTVal Cox Day, testified that the water in dispute here 
was used on this land to his knowledge for the first time 
in 1916 or 1917, when the then owneT traded Lehi Irriga-
tion Company water for ,ten shares of Provo Reservoir 
Company (now Provo Reservoir Water Users Company) 
stock (Tr. 68). 
The record shows on the plaintiff Hugh J. Hatch's tes-
timony that at one time there were fifteen shares of water 
used on the land (Tr. 49), and that at another time a pre-
vious owner had transferred 7lj2 shares of that water to 
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other land in exchange for Lehi Irrigation Company water, 
the certificate for which was transferred to the plaintiffs 
on the sale to them by defendants, and plaintiffs knew this 
(Tr. 50). The record is devoid of evidence that this water 
right was initiated as appurtenant water. One wonders 
exactly when it could have become such. 
Plaintiffs rely upon Brimm v. Cache Valley Banking 
Co., supra, in support of their position. We respectfully sub-
mit that that case is not in point. In that case the water 
right was initiated as an appurtenance of the land and only 
after many years was it conveyed to an irrigation company 
in exchange for stock. Thereafter it was used for many 
years on the same land, and only there, without change, 
although title to the land was the subject of transfers with-
out express mention of the water rights. The land was 
practically valueless without the water, and the appraisers 
for the probate court arrived art their valuation of the land 
by considering that the water was a part of it. The rec-
ord title to the shares still rested in the person who had 
owned the water right as an appurtenance and had con-
veyed it to the company in exchange for such shares of 
stock. 'Dhe land had never been irrigated with other water, 
and the water had never been used elsewhere. This Court 
stated that such evidence was sufficiently clear and con-
vincing that the presumption created by Section 73-1-10, 
U. C. A. 1953, could be considered by the trial court as hav-
ing been rebutted. 
None of the facts of that case measure up with the 
one presently before the Court. In truth, the facts of the 
case at bar more closely resemble those of George v. Robi-
son, et al, 23 Utah 79, 63 Pac. 819, wherein the court stated 
that "From an examination of the evidence the conclusion 
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is irresistible that the water rights in question were treated 
by the owners as personal property, constituted no part 
of the realty, and, not being expressly mentioned or re-
ferred to in the deed, werre not conveyed with the land, and 
til.at there is no proof that warranted the court in finding 
that the water was appurtEnant to the land, or that the 
water rights were included in the warranty." 
Certainly the trial court here was warranted in find-
ing that the statutory presumption was NOT overcome. 
II. PAROLE TESTIMONY ON NEGOTIATIONS 
PRELIMINARY TO EXECUTION OF THE CONTRACT 
WAS PROPERLY STRICKEN BY THE TRIAL COURT, 
BECAUSE IF BELIEVED IT WOULD AT MOST VARY 
THE TERMS OF THE WRITTEN ·AGREEMENT, AND 
HAD NO PROBATIVE VALUE ON THE QUESTION 
WHETHER THE WATER INVOLVED WAS OR WAS 
NOT APPURTENANT TO THE LAND SOLD. 
Much of the trial time was consumed in presenting 
testimony on negotiations preliminary to the execution of 
the contract of sale bearing on conversations and discus-
sions concerning the water rights in issue. This was ap-
parently offered in an attempt to meet the second require-
ment set forth in the Brimm case, supra, in order to over-
come the statutory presumption-that is, to show that the 
grantor intended to convey the shares in question. None 
of it bore upon the question of appurtenant water; all of 
it was disputed. The trial court, we respectfully submit, 
properly ordered it stricken. Much of the statement of fact 
in the plaintiffs' brief on appeal (pages 4-6) is devoted to 
such evidence. 
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The trial court found no ambiguity in the contract. 
Plaintif.fis, it would appear, agree (plaintiffs' brief on appeal, 
page 16). We do not deem it necessary to belabor the pa-
role evidence rule. Absent the question whether this water 
is appurtenant, all evidence offered to show that the par-
ties intended that the certificate for this water was to be 
oonveyed was properly stricken, as calculated to vary the 
terms of rthe written agreement. 
lt will be recalled that this Court has said the grantee 
must "show by clear and convincing evidence that said 
water was in fact appurtenant and that the grantor inten-
ded to transfer the water right with the land." Brimm v. 
Cache Valley Banking Co., supra. In 1 Weil, Water Rights 
in the Western ·states, 3d Ed., sec. 550, the rule is stated 
thus: 
". . . whether a water-right passes as an appm-
tenance involves two questions, viz: (a) Whether 1Jhe 
water-right is an appurtenance, and (b) whether, be-
ing such, it was intended to pass." (emphasis added) 
As stated earlier, the plaintifs failed in their burden to 
show that the water was in fact appurtenant. Rather, 
all evidence rebuts such position. How, then, can one say 
that parole evidence to vary the terms of the contract should 
be admissible? 
Were this parole testimony admissible, then we sub-
Init that it would preponderate against plaintiffs' position, 
and their's was the burden of proof. 
First, the assertion that the water right or the cer-
tificate representing the right which is in litigation was 
discussed or even mentioned at any stage of the negotia-
tions is vigorously denied by defendants. 
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Second, after they had taken possession of the farm, 
and for the period plaintiffs were using the water in con-
troversy, they paid promptly all assessements on the Al-
pine Irrigati0!11 Company and Lehi Irrigation Company 
stbck, but allowed the Provo Reservoir Wate·r Users Com-
pany stock to go delinquent and be sold for assessments 
(Tr. 55-56). 
Third, upon executing the earnest money agreement 
rut the bank, great care was made to identify the stock cer-
tificates for the water in the Lehi Irrigation Compay and 
the Alpine Irrigation Company, but the Provo Rerervoir 
Water Users Company stock was not even mentioned there-
in (Exhibit 1 "E") ( Tr. 46-47), though plaintiffs would 
have us believe it was almost the sole subjeot of discussion 
during negotiations to purchase the farm! 
Fourth, any doubt that the plaintiffs knew all the time 
that such water was not sold to them is dispelled by the 
letter of December 29, 1953, from the plaintiff Ardean 
Hatch to the defendant Stephen Adams (E~hibit Def.-2). 
Of course, it is our position that all this is immaterial 
anyway, but giving it credence, the result is contrary to 
plaintiffs' positi0!11. 
We re-assert that this is not a case bottomed on fraud 
or mistake, nor is it an action to reform the CO!I1tract. 
CONCLUSION 
In their brief on appeal (p. 17), plaintiffs state that 
"the defendant has not satisfied his burden of proving the 
water was not transferred with the land." We respect-
fully submit that the burden is the plaintiffs' to ·show that 
it was, and that by clear and convincing evidence. 
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Far from supporting plaintiffs' theory, the record 
shows that the water involved was not appurtenant, but 
was always treated as personal property, freely transfer-
rable by endorsement of the stock certificates, and that this 
was known to plaintiffs. The parties all agree that the 
forty shares of Deer Creek water passed as an appurte-
nance. Care was exercised to see that the Lehi Irrigation. 
Compay and Alpine Irrigation Company water, represen-
ted by stock eertificates, were included in the escrow agree-
ment. The parties knew they were dealing with both ap-
purtenant water and water rights that were personal prop-
erty. They made no mention in the contract of the stock 
certificate now sought by plaintiffs. They are now endeav-
oring to re-write a plain and tmambiguous contract by 
means of parole evidence. 
We respec1fully submit that the rtrial court properly 
found that the statutory presumption created by section 
73-1-10, U. C. A. 1953, was not rebutted by the evidence. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DALLAS H. YOUNG 
for YOUNG, YOUNG & SORENSEN 
Attorneys for Respondents and 
Defendants 
227 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 
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